



Verordnung vom 25. Mai 2005 über Massnahmen gegenüber Sudan (SR 946.231.18),
Anhang

Art. 2 Abs. 1 (Finanzsanktionen) und Art. 4 Abs. 1 (Ein- und Durchreiseverbot), Anhang 1

Origin: UN, EU

Ordonnance du 25 mai 2005 instituant des mesures à l'encontre du Soudan (RS
946.231.18), annexe

*art. 2, al. 1 (Sanctions financières) et art. 4, al. 1 (Interdiction de séjour et de transit), annexe
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Origin: UN, EU

Ordinanza del 25 maggio 2005 che istituisce provvedimenti nei confronti del Sudan (RS
946.231.18), allegato

art. 2 cpv. 1 (Sanzioni finanziarie) e art. 4 cpv. 1 (Divieto di entrata e di transito), allegato 1

Origin: UN, EU

Individuals

SSID: 190-3072 **Name:** Elhassan Gaffar Mohammed

DOB: 24 Jun 1952 **Good quality a.k.a.:** Gaffar Mohmed Elhassan **Identification**

document: ID card No. 4302, Sudan (Ex-serviceman's identification card)

Justification: **a)** Major-General and Commander of the Western Military Region for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). **b)** The Panel of Experts report that Major-General Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan stated to them that he had direct operational command (primarily tactical command) of all elements of the SAF in Darfur while he was in command of the Western Military Region. Elhassan held this position as Western Military Area Commander from Nov 2004 (approx.) to early 2006. The Panel's information is that Elhassan was responsible for violations of paragraph 7 of SCR 1591 as by virtue of this position he requested (from Khartoum) and authorized (since 29 Mar 2005) the transfer of military equipment into Darfur without the prior approval of the 1591 Committee. Elhassan himself admitted to the Panel of Experts that aircraft, aircraft engines and other military equipment had been brought into Darfur from other parts of Sudan between 29 Mar 2005 and Dec 2005. For example he informed the Panel that 2 Mi-24 attack helicopters were brought unauthorized into Darfur between 18 and 21 Sep 2005. There are also reasonable grounds to believe that Elhassan was directly responsible, as Western Military Area Commander, for authorizing offensive military flights in the area around Abu Hamra, 23-24 Jul 2005 and in the Jebel Moon area of Western Darfur, on 19 Nov 2005. Mi-24 attack helicopters were involved in both operations and reportedly opened fire on both occasions. The Panel of Experts report that Elhassan indicated to the Panel that he himself approved requests for air support and other air operations in his capacity as Western Military Area Commander. (See Panel of Experts report, S/2006/65, paragraphs 266-269.) Through such actions Major-General Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan has breached relevant provisions of SCR 1591 and therefore meets the criteria to be designated by the Committee to be subjected to sanctions.

Other information: **a)** Retired from the Sudanese Army. **b)** Address: Resides in El Waha, Omdurman, Sudan. **Modifications:** Amended on 19 Apr 2013

SSID: 190-3078 **Name:** Alnsiem Musa Hilal Abdalla

DOB: **a)** 1 Jan 1964 **b)** 1959 **POB:** Kutum **Low quality a.k.a.:** **a)** Sheikh Musa Hilal **b)** Abd Allah **c)** Abdallah **d)** AlNasim **e)** Al Nasim **f)** AlNaseem **g)** Al Naseem **h)** AlNasseem **i)** Al Nasseem **Address:** **a)** Kabkabiya, Sudan **b)** Kutum, Sudan (resides in Kabkabiya and the city of Kutum, Northern Darfur and has resided in Khartoum) **Nationality:** Sudan

Identification document: **a)** Diplomatic passport No. D014433, Sudan, Date of issue: 21 Feb 2013, Expiry date: 21 Feb 2015 **b)** Diplomatic passport No. D009889, Sudan, Date of issue: 17 Feb 2011, Expiry date: 17 Feb 2013 **c)** Other No. A0680623, Sudan (Certificate of nationality)

Justification: **a)** Formerly member of the National Assembly of Sudan from Al-Waha district **b)** Formerly special adviser to the Ministry of Federal Affairs **c)** Paramount Chief of the Mahamid Tribe in North Darfur **d)** Report from Human Rights Watch states they have a memo dated 13 Feb 2004 from a local government office in North Darfur ordering "security units in the locality" to "allow the activities of the mujahideen and the volunteers under the command of the Sheikh Musa Hilal to proceed in the areas of [North Darfur] and to secure their vital needs". On 28 Sep 2005, 400 Arab militia attacked the villages of Aro Sharrow (including its IDP camp), Acho, and Gozmena in West Darfur. We also believe that Musa Hilal was present during the attack on Aro Sharrow IDP camp: his son had been killed during the SLA attack on Shareia, so he was now involved in a personal blood feud. There are reasonable grounds to believe that as the Paramount Chief he had direct responsibility for these actions and is responsible for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and other atrocities **Other information:** Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. **Modifications:** Amended on 19 Apr 2013, 6 Jun 2014, 17 Oct 2017, 17 Oct 2017, 14 Mar 2018

SSID: 190-3092 **Name:** Mayu Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim

DOB: 1 Jan 1967 **POB:** Nile District, El-Fasher, El-Fasher, North-Darfur **Good quality a.k.a.:** **a)** General Gibril Abdul Kareem Barey **b)** Tek **c)** Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri **Address:** Tine, Sudan (resides in Tine, on the Sudanese side of the border with Chad)

Nationality: Sudan **Identification document:** **a)** Other No. 192-3238459-9, Sudan (National ID number) **b)** Other No. 302581, Sudan (Certificate of nationality)

Justification: **a)** National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) Field Commander **b)** Mayu is responsible for the kidnapping of African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) personnel in Darfur during Oct 2005. Mayu openly attempts to thwart the AMIS mission through intimidation; for example he threatened to shoot down African Union (AU) helicopters in the Jebel Moon area in Nov 2005. Through such actions Mayu has clearly violated SCR 1591 in constituting a threat to stability in Darfur and meets the criteria to be designated by the Committee to be subjected to sanctions **Other information:** Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. **Modifications:** Amended on 19 Apr 2013, 10 Oct 2013, 6 Jun 2014, 17 Oct 2017, 14 Mar 2018

Verordnung vom 25. Mai 2005 über Massnahmen gegenüber Sudan (SR 946.231.18), Anhang Art. 2 Abs. 1 (Finanzsanktionen) und Art. 4 Abs. 1 (Ein- und Durchreiseverbot), Anhang 2 Origin: UN, EU

Ordonnance du 25 mai 2005 instituant des mesures à l'encontre du Soudan (RS 946.231.18), annexe
art. 2, al. 1 (Sanctions financières) et art. 4, al. 1 (Interdiction de séjour et de transit), annexe 2

Origin: UN, EU

Ordinanza del 25 maggio 2005 che istituisce provvedimenti nei confronti del Sudan (RS 946.231.18), allegato

art. 2 cpv. 1 (Sanzioni finanziarie) e art. 4 cpv. 1 (Divieto di entrata e di transito), allegato 2

Origin: UN, EU

Individuals

SSID: 190-74932 **Name:** Suleiman Mirghani Idriss

Sex: M **Nationality:** Sudan

Justification: **a)** Lieutenant General Mirghani Idriss Suleiman is an officer of the SAF and Director General of Defense Industry System (DIS), a company sanctioned by the European Union for providing support to actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. **b)** DIS is described as Sudan's largest defence enterprise, generating an estimated USD 2 billion in revenue through hundreds of subsidiaries across various sectors of Sudan's economy. DIS manufactures a range of small arms, conventional weapons, ammunition and military vehicles for the SAF. **c)** As the Director General of DIS, Mirghani Idriss Suleiman has travelled extensively with General Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, Commander-in-Chief of the SAF, since the beginning of the war, allegedly, to enhance the SAF's capabilities to fight the RSF on several fronts in Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan. **d)**

Therefore, Mirghani Idriss Suleiman provides support to actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan. **Other information:** **a)** Function: Lieutenant General in the SAF; Director General of Defence Industries System; Head of Sudanese Army Production Agency **b)** Associated individuals: General Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, Commander-in-Chief of the SAF **c)** Associated entities: Defense Industry System, SMT Engineering; SAF

Modifications: Listed on 9 Jul 2024

SSID: 190-74943 **Name:** El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin

Sex: M **Good quality a.k.a.:** **a)** El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin Al-Taher **b)** Al-Awad Al-Amin Mohammed **Nationality:** Sudan

Justification: **a)** El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin is a Lieutenant General in the SAF and Commander of the Sudanese Air Force since 1 September 2022. He is therefore in charge of the operations carried out by the Air Force of the SAF since the outbreak of the conflict between the SAF, the RSF and their allied militias on 15 April 2023, as underscored by his participation in publicly disclosed high-level meetings of senior commanders of the SAF headed by the Commander-in-Chief Abdelfattah Al-Burhan in the General Command of the SAF in Khartoum in May and July 2023. **b)** El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin therefore holds a direct command responsibility in the indiscriminate aerial bombing carried out by the Air Force of the SAF in densely populated residential areas, notably in Khartoum, Omdurman, Nyala (South Darfur) and in North Kordofan, documented by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) in its 31 August 2023 and 13 November 2023 reports to the Secretary-General, by the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights in its 22 February 2024 report and by the United Nations Panel of Experts on Sudan in its 15 January 2024 report. **c)** El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin has thus been engaged directly in the continuation of the Sudanese conflict, which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan, and has been involved in planning, directing and committing aerial operations which have resulted in serious human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law by causing high numbers of civilian casualties, leading to displacement of the civilian population and to the destruction of critical infrastructures, including medical facilities such as the East Nile Hospital in Khartoum in May 2023 and the Babiker Nahar Paediatric Hospital in El-Fasher in May 2024. **Other information:** **a)** Function: Lieutenant General, Commander of the Sudanese Air Force since 1 September 2022; Former Dean of the Sudanese Air Force College; Former Commander of the Khartoum Air Base **b)** Associated individuals: General Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, Supreme Commander of the SAF; Lieutenant General Yasir al-Atta, Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the SAF; General Mohamed Osman al-Hussein, Chief of Staff of SAF Land Forces **c)** Associated entities: SAF **Modifications:** Listed on 9 Jul 2024

SSID: 190-74955 **Name:** Karti Mohamed Ali Ahmed

Sex: M **DOB:** 11 Mar 1953 **POB:** Hagar Elassal, Sudan **Nationality:** Sudan **Identification document:** Other No. 11822483949, Sudan (ID number)

Justification: **a)** Ali Ahmed Karti Mohamed was the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Government of Omar al-Bashir. Following the fall of the al-Bashir regime, Ali Ahmed Karti Mohamed was selected as one of the leaders of the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) and led efforts to derail Sudan's progress towards a full democratic transition, by undermining the former civilian-led transitional government and the Framework Political Agreement process. This contributed to the conflict between the SAF and RSF, which began on 15 April 2023. **b)** He and other hardline Sudanese Islamists are actively obstructing efforts to reach a ceasefire to end the conflict and they are opposing civilian efforts to restore Sudan's democratic transition. Ali Ahmed Karti Mohamed is a stalwart of the National Congress Party (NCP), founded by Omar Al-Bashir in 1998. The NCP is the successor organisation to the Brotherhood-affiliated National Islamic Front. **c)** Ali Ahmed Karti Mohamed is currently the Secretary-General of the SIM, a broad alliance of Islamist groups, and is considered to be the man behind the NCP's resurgence. The Islamist movement has a strong influence on the SAF, police and intelligence services. **d)** Therefore, Ali Ahmed Karti Mohamed engages directly or indirectly in, provides support to, or benefits from, actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan. **Other information:** **a)** Function: Stalwart of the National Congress Party; Secretary-General of the Sudanese Islamist Movement; Former Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs **b)** Associated entities: Sudanese Foreign Ministry; Sudanese Islamic Movement **Modifications:** Listed on 9 Jul 2024

SSID: 190-74969 **Name:** Juma Barakallah Abdulrahman

Sex: M **POB:** Al Daein - Abu Matareq, East Darfur, Sudan **Good quality a.k.a.:** **a)** Major-General Gomaa Abdulrahman **b)** Juma Barakallah Abdul Rahman **Nationality:** Sudan

Justification: **a)** Abdulrahman Juma Barakallah is a prominent General among the RSF, who commands the RSF's military force in West Darfur. **b)** He is responsible for committing atrocities and other abuses, inducing ethnically motivated killings, targeted attacks on human rights activists and defenders, conflict-related sexual violence, and for the looting and burning of communities. **c)** He is also responsible for kidnapping and assassinating the

Governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abbakar, and his brother. Khamis Abbakar was killed hours after he accused the RSF and allied militias of attacking local communities in Al Geneina, capital of West Darfur, in an interview with the Saudi-owned television station, Al Hadath and Emirati television Al Arabiya. **d)** Abdulrahman Juma Barakallah has also been accused by international Non-Governmental Organisations of being responsible for the genocide of the Masalit community. **e)** Therefore, Abdulrahman Juma Barakallah is responsible for planning, directing or committing acts in West Darfur that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law, including killings and maimings, rape and other serious forms of sexual and gender-based violence, abduction and forced displacement. As a General of the RSF in West Darfur, he also engages directly or indirectly in actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan. **Other information: a)** Function: RSF Major General and RSF Commander of West Darfur **b)** Associated entities: RSF **Modifications:** Listed on 9 Jul 2024

SSID: 190-75007 **Name:** Abdel Nabi Mohamed Mustafa Ibrahim

Sex: M **Nationality:** Sudan **Identification document:** Passport No. B CH 4930920, Sudan

Justification: a) Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed is a former senior official of the Sudanese Central Bank who became the RSF's financial adviser, helping it to manage a web of proxy companies and entities. **b)** A UN Panel of Experts Report on sanctions in Darfur recently referred to a former senior official of the Sudanese Central Bank who is based in Dubai and has become the RSF's financial adviser without naming him. The report also explains that al Khaleej Bank became instrumental to the RSF's financing in 2019 when its majority ownership was acquired by individuals and entities associated with the RSF. **c)** Media reports and think-tanks have identified him as Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed. He is a Director of Al Khaleej Bank, a Sudanese bank. **d)** Over 60 % of the shares of Al Khaleej Bank are held by companies associated with the family of Mohammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), the head of the RSF. **e)** Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed is also the majority shareholder of Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. The other shareholder in this company is one of the brothers of Hemedti, namely Musa Hamdan Dagalo Musa, and this company holds over 14 % of the shareholding in al Khaleej Bank. **f)** As a financial adviser to the RSF and the Dagalo family, Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed is engaging directly or indirectly in providing support to, or benefitting from, actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan. **Other information: a)** Function: Director of al-Khaleej Bank; majority shareholder of Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. (Sudan); financial adviser to the leader of the RSF **b)** Associated individuals: Musa Hamdan Dagalo Musa, brother of RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo **c)** Associated entities: Al-Khaleej Bank; Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. (Sudan) **Modifications:** Listed on 9 Jul 2024

SSID: 190-75023 **Name:** Aseel Masar Abdurahman

Sex: M **Good quality a.k.a.:** **a)** Assil Massar Abdelrahman **b)** Eseil Masar Abdelrahman **c)** Assel Massar **d)** Asil Masar

Justification: a) Masar Abdurahman Aseel is a prominent tribal leader of the Mahamid clan in West Darfur. The Mahamid clan belongs to the Rizeigat tribe which gathers Arab communities inhabiting Darfur and Chad. He holds the title of Amir and is a member of the Native Administration in West Darfur. **b)** Masar Abdurahman Aseel has facilitated the attacks led by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allied militias against local communities living in El Geneina (West Darfur), especially the Massalit people, since April 2023. In particular, he directly contributed to the recruitment and arming of militias by the RSF and to

the coordination between these forces, as is reported by the 15th final report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Sudan published in January 2024, to carry out their ethnically targeted attacks, notably against the Massalit communities, in West Darfur between late April and early November 2023. Propaganda videos featuring Masar Abdurahman Aseel were published by the RSF in March and in April 2024, demonstrating his warmongering support to the RSF and his role in rallying the troops behind the RSF to join their fight against the SAF since 15 April 2023. **c)** Masar Abdurahman Aseel has therefore engaged directly in, provided support to and benefitted from actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. By supporting the seizing of West Darfur by the RSF, Masar Abdurahman Aseel has strengthened his position and influence within the Native Administration of West Darfur, at the expense of other community leaders, notably belonging to the Massalit community, which have been targeted by the RSF and their allied militias.

Other information: Function: Amir of the Mahamid clan in West Darfur; Member of the Native Administration in West Darfur **Modifications:** Listed on 9 Jul 2024

Entities

SSID: 190-73547 **Name:** Defense Industries System

DOF: 1993 (approximately) **Good quality a.k.a.:** **a)** Military Industry Corporation **b)** Defense Industries Corporation **Address:** Khartoum North, Khartoum, 10783, Sudan

Justification: **a)** Defense Industries System (DIS), previously known as the Military Industrial Corporation (MIC), is a large Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)-owned conglomerate which manages a network of military-controlled companies. DIS generates substantial annual revenues, estimated at USD 2 billion in 2020. **b)** DIS manufactures and provides the SAF with a range of military equipment, including weapons, ammunition, aircraft and military vehicles, which are used by the armed forces in the conflict in Sudan. **c)** DIS controls together with SMT Engineering (SMT), through a network of direct and indirect shareholdings, numerous companies of the SAF-controlled GIAD conglomerate, which is also involved in the production of weapons and vehicles for the armed forces, as well as in the provision of services to the SAF, in particular through a partnership between GIAD for Automotive Services and the Corps of Engineers. **d)** The Director-General of DIS has accompanied Commander Al-Burhan during his official visits abroad since April 2023. **e)** Therefore, DIS provides support to SAF actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. In addition, DIS is associated with SMT which also provides support to the SAF's actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan.

Other information: Type of entity: Public entity **Modifications:** Listed on 10 Apr 2024

SSID: 190-73580 **Name:** SMT Engineering

Good quality a.k.a.: **a)** Sudan Master Technology **b)** SMT **Address:** SMT Building Madani Road, KM 50 Khartoum, Giad Industrial Complex, Gamhuria Street Khartoum, Khartoum, Sudan

Justification: **a)** SMT Engineering (SMT) is a Sudan-based company which owns or controls, together with DIS, numerous companies of the SAF-controlled GIAD conglomerate, through a network of direct and indirect shareholdings. SMT is the main shareholder of three GIAD companies in which DIS owns the rest of the shares (GIAD for the automotive and truck industry, GIAD complex for heavy mechanism industries and GIAD metal industries complex). SMT also owns or controls, directly or indirectly, many other companies that are part of the GIAD conglomerate and in which DIS also holds stakes, such as GIAD for Automotive Services. **b)** The GIAD conglomerate is involved in the production of weapons

and vehicles for the armed forces, as well as in the provision of services to the SAF, in particular through a partnership between GIAD for Automotive Services and the Corps of Engineers. **c)** DIS is a large SAF-owned conglomerate which provides support for SAF actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan, in particular through the manufacture and provision of a range of military equipment, including weapons, ammunition, aircraft and military vehicles, which are used by the armed forces in the conflict in Sudan. **d)** Therefore, SMT Engineering provides support for SAF actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. It is also associated with DIS, which also provides support for SAF actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. **Other information:** Type of entity: State Controlled Company **Modifications:** Listed on 10 Apr 2024

SSID: 190-73650 **Name:** Zadna International Company for Investment Limited

DOF: 1997 (approximately) **Address:** Doha Street Property 436, Manshia Doha Street, Khartoum, 11429, Sudan

Justification: **a)** Zadna International Company for Investment Limited (Zadna) is a holding company in agriculture and construction, which is 99 % owned by the SAF controlled Special Fund for the Social Security of the Armed Forces (SFSSAF), formerly known as the Charity Organisation for the Support of the Armed Forces. **b)** The leader of the SAF, Commander Al-Burhan, appointed in October 2021 General El Mirghani Idris Suleiman as Chairman of Zadna, who is one of his friends and Director of DIS. **c)** In May 2023, he also appointed Dr Taha Hussein Yousef as Director-General of Zadna. **d)** The SFSSAF and Zadna are part of the vast network of companies and organisations owned or controlled by the SAF, which are used to sustain the power of the armed forces over the Sudanese economy. **e)** Zadna is a leading company engaged in high-profile international business deals and is one of the top revenue earners in the army's network of companies. Therefore, it generates substantial revenues for the benefit of the SAF, which enables the armed forces to finance and continue the conflict in Sudan. **f)** Therefore, Zadna International Company for Investment Limited provides support for SAF actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. **Other information:** Type of entity: State Controlled Company **Modifications:** Listed on 10 Apr 2024

SSID: 190-73690 **Name:** Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd

DOF: 2009 (approximately) **Good quality a.k.a.:** **a)** Ajmac multi activities company **b)** Al Gunade **Address:** **a)** Street 3 Khartoum Block 17 Alryad, Khartoum, Sudan **b)** Industrial Area 13, P.O.Box 61401, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates

Justification: **a)** Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd (Al Junaid) is a Sudanese holding company controlled by Rapid Support Forces' (RSF) Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and his brother, RSF Deputy Commander Abdul Rahim Dagalo. The company is owned by Abdul Rahim Dagalo and his two sons. Hemedti himself is on its board of directors. **b)** Based in Khartoum, Al Junaid operates subsidiaries across multiple economic sectors, including gold mining and trade, and covers a large part of Sudan's gold industry. The company has mining concessions in Darfur, in particular in the vicinity of Jebel Amer (North Darfur) and in the Singo area (South Darfur), and it also operates beyond that region. **c)** The gold mines of Darfur are under the control of the RSF, including the Jebel Amer site since 2017. **d)** Gold mining and trade through Al Junaid generates a substantial source of revenue for the Dagalo family and the RSF, which enables them to finance and continue the conflict in Sudan. **e)** The RSF is also using Al Junaid's gold production and

exports to secure military support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to which most of Sudan's gold production is smuggled, and from the Wagner Group, including the provision of weapons used by the RSF in the conflict in Sudan. **f)** Therefore, Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd provides support for RSF actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. **Other information:** Type of entity: Limited Company **Modifications:** Listed on 10 Apr 2024

SSID: 190-73705 **Name:** Tradive General Trading Co

DOF: 2018 (approximately) **Address:** P.O.Box 86436, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Justification: **a)** Tradive General Trading Co (Tradive) is a company based in the UAE whose director and ultimate beneficial owner is RSF Major Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, the youngest brother of Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). **b)** Tradive is part of the RSF's commercial network which generates stable revenue for the RSF enabling them to finance and continue the conflict in Sudan. It is used as an RSF front company, channelling substantial sums into and out of the RSF, and enabling the purchase of material to support RSF operations. **c)** For instance, Tradive has purchased vehicles for the RSF, including Toyota Hilux and Land Cruiser pick-up trucks, which are often converted into highly mobile "technicals", which are armed desert vehicles. In the first half of 2019, more than one thousand such vehicles were imported into Sudan from the UAE. These converted vehicles have been used by the RSF for a long time and continue to be used by it in the conflict in Sudan, in particular to patrol the areas under RSF control. **d)** Therefore, Tradive General Trading Co provides support for RSF actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. **Other information:** Type of entity: Limited Company **Modifications:** Listed on 10 Apr 2024

SSID: 190-73715 **Name:** GSK ADVANCE COMPANY LTD

Address: Ahmed Khair Street, Khartoum, 11111, Sudan

Justification: **a)** GSK is a Sudan-based information technology and security company, which is 60 % owned by RSF Major Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, the youngest brother of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). **b)** GSK is part of the RSF's commercial network which generates stable revenue for the RSF enabling them to finance and continue the conflict in Sudan. It is used by the RSF as a front company, facilitating cash flows into the RSF and being involved in the RSF's procurement processes. **c)** In addition, since at least 2019, GSK has been working with Aviatrade LLC, a Russia-based military supply company, on the purchase and supply of material and equipment for the benefit of the RSF, including the corresponding training, and on the purchase and supply of unmanned aerial vehicles, monitoring equipment and spare parts. Reconnaissance and weaponised drones are used by the RSF in the conflict in Sudan. **d)** Therefore, GSK Advance Company LTD provides support for RSF actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. **Other information:** Type of entity: Limited Company **Modifications:** Listed on 10 Apr 2024