On 19 December 2025, Parliament amended the War Material Act. The amendment is intended to enable the Federal Council to respond appropriately to the new security and foreign policy challenges facing Switzerland today, in a geopolitical environment that has deteriorated sharply in recent years. A referendum was called against the amendment. Swiss voters will therefore have the final say on 29 November 2026.
On 29 September 2026, the President of the Swiss Confederation launched the referendum campaign on the amendment to the War Material Act on behalf of the Federal Council:
The proposal
The War Material Act sets out the conditions under which weapons, weapons systems and weapon components may be exported. An export is not authorised, for example, if the country of destination is involved in an armed conflict or violates human rights. Nor is it authorised if there is a risk that the war material will be used against the civilian population or passed on unlawfully.
The various conflicts of recent years have significantly worsened the security situation – including in Europe. So that the Federal Council can respond appropriately to the new challenges, Parliament has decided to adapt the conditions governing the export of war material:
war material may now be supplied to a partner state (see Annex 2 to the War Material Ordinance) involved in an armed conflict, provided this is compatible with Swiss neutrality and with Switzerland's foreign or security policy interests;
the Federal Council may depart from the authorisation criteria, but only in exceptional circumstances and where this is necessary to safeguard Switzerland's interests;
states purchasing Swiss war material will no longer be required in every case to seek Switzerland's consent before transferring it to another country. Switzerland will nonetheless continue to require such consent, by means of a non-re-export declaration, whenever foreign policy, neutrality policy or security policy reasons so require. Commitments already entered into in respect of war material delivered previously remain valid.
As is already the case today, all export licences must continue to comply with the law of neutrality, with human rights and with Switzerland's other international obligations.
A referendum was called against these amendments, which is why the proposal is being put to a popular vote.
Arguments of the referendum committee
In the view of the referendum committee, the War Material Act will be weakened because arms exports could be authorised to rogue states that are involved in a war or that systematically violate human rights. By dispensing with the non-re-export declaration, Switzerland will moreover lose all control over where its war material ends up, which could thus reach not only rogue states but also terrorist organisations.
The position of the Federal Council and Parliament
As current events show, the risk of armed conflicts breaking out has increased. Even European states, which account for over 80 per cent of Swiss war material exports, could become involved in conflicts of this kind. The amendment to the War Material Act ensures that Switzerland's partner states can, where the law of neutrality permits, continue to be supplied with war material even in the event of a conflict, and that they may pass on material purchased in Switzerland.
In times of crisis, defence industries serve their own country first. A country with nothing to offer has nothing to ask for. If Switzerland wants to be supplied on the day it needs to be, it must itself offer war material and remain integrated into international value chains. Only on that condition can it maintain a competitive defence industry — not as an end in itself, but because its security depends on it.
The amendment therefore strengthens Switzerland's security, because it reinforces its negotiating position on the defence market. This matters all the more given that our country, being neutral, belongs to no defence alliance.
For all these reasons, the Federal Council and Parliament recommend accepting the amendment to the War Material Act.
weapons, weapons systems, ammunition and military explosives;
equipment designed for the conduct of combat;
components for the manufacture of war material where it is evident that they can be used exclusively for military purposes.
No, direct exports of war material to Ukraine would remain prohibited even under the amended Act. In the case of the war in Ukraine, it would not be possible for the Federal Council to depart from the “armed conflict” exclusion criterion, because the law of neutrality will remain fully applicable even after the amendment.
Direct exports from Switzerland to Ukraine cannot be authorised under the law of neutrality. For private exports, the principle of equal treatment enshrined in the law of neutrality applies: since Switzerland maintains an embargo on military equipment against Russia, it may not supply such equipment to Ukraine either, where this is liable to confer a military advantage. It also follows that Switzerland could not consent to a transfer of goods to Ukraine, since such consent would likewise confer a military advantage.
The amendment provides that a non-re-export declaration will no longer be required systematically, unless foreign policy, neutrality policy or security policy reasons so require. Accordingly, if, when assessing an export application to a European country, SECO finds a high risk that the material to be exported would be sent directly to Ukraine, a non-re-export declaration will be required. If that risk is deemed too high despite such a declaration, the export application will have to be refused.
If, on the other hand, when assessing an export application to a European country, that country provides credible assurances that the material it wishes to acquire is intended for its own needs, no non-re-export declaration will be required. In that case, should the purchasing country decide several years later to transfer the material to Ukraine after all, re-exports to that country would de facto be possible.
In short, in order to comply with neutrality, the Swiss authorities would have to ensure, when assessing each export application, that the war material the final state recipient wishes to acquire is not transferred, directly or indirectly, to a third country involved in an international armed conflict. If the material were passed on directly from the purchasing country to a belligerent state, this would constitute a diversion and therefore a breach of the law of neutrality.
Because that country is involved in an international armed conflict, the exclusion criterion in the War Material Act relating to armed conflicts is met. Since the escalation of the conflict on 28 February 2026, no new application for a definitive export of war material to the United States has therefore been approved.
The amendments to the War Material Act would give the Federal Council the room for manoeuvre it currently lacks to issue new export licences, even if the conflict were to continue over the long term. All export applications concerning material that is not militarily relevant to the conflict with Iran could thus be authorised. This might involve, for example, components exported to a US defence company for incorporation into a weapons system ordered by European countries.
The amendment would therefore allow Swiss industry to remain part of complex value chains involving the United States, which is not possible today. This integration is essential for foreign and security policy reasons.
The law of neutrality would remain fully applicable. Only exports of war material that confers no military advantage on the country involved in the international conflict in question could therefore be authorised.
It should be recalled that every export of war material requires a licence from SECO. Each application is assessed on a case-by-case basis, on the basis of the provisions of war material legislation. In all cases, international law, the principles of Swiss foreign policy and Switzerland's international obligations must be respected. If the assessment of an export application shows a high risk that the material to be exported would be diverted to a third country to which Switzerland does not in principle approve any exports, either a non-re-export declaration will be required or the application will have to be refused.
No, because all exports of war material will remain subject to a licence issued by SECO. Each application is assessed on a case-by-case basis, on the basis of the authorisation criteria set out in the War Material Act. In all cases, the granting of an export licence must not run counter to the principles of Swiss foreign policy or to Switzerland's international obligations.
Those obligations include the Arms Trade Treaty. Consequently, if the assessment of an export application shows that granting it could lead to a breach of the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty, the Swiss authorities will have to refuse it.
Originally, all the countries listed in Annex 2 to the War Material Ordinance had acceded to the four international export control regimes for strategically sensitive goods (the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime).
These countries therefore have an export control regime similar to Switzerland's. Last May, the Federal Council decided to add to this list those European Union (EU) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries not yet included. Since 1 July, Annex 2 to the Ordinance has thus contained 36 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
EU and EFTA states are bound by the same export control principles as Switzerland. The EU's arms export policy is based on Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, to which Norway and Iceland also largely subscribe. While decisions on export applications are taken case by case in accordance with national sovereignty, states undertake to apply eight determining criteria:
Under the first four criteria, arms exports are prohibited in the event of an international embargo, where there is a concrete risk of internal repression or of serious human rights violations, and where there is a risk of aggravating armed conflicts or regional tensions.
The other four criteria are designed, respectively, to protect the security interests of allied countries; to take account of the recipient country's conduct towards the international community, particularly as regards counter-terrorism; to minimise the risk of the goods to be exported being unlawfully diverted to an unauthorised end user; and to check whether military expenditure is proportionate to the economic development of the country of final destination.
